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I. Introduction
In the wake of the recent dissolution of redevelopment agencies in
California, communities across the state have lost one of their strongest 
tools for cleaning up potentially productive properties deemed too 
contaminated to develop without environmental remediation.  The reuse of 
properties contaminated with hazardous substances, known in the industry 
as  “brownfields,” generates a plethora of community benefits, including 
accelerated economic growth, improved public health and lessened 
environmental risks from latent industrial pollutants and wastes.  Despite 
these benefits, public and private entities alike have been historically 
unwilling to take on the often onerous financial and legal risks of cleaning 
up these areas in line with strict federal and state environmental regulatory 
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requirements.  In response, California redevelopment agencies (“RDAs”) 
stepped in during the past few decades and became largely responsible for 
the accelerating remediation of many of these brownfields sites, 
engendering the economic and legal viability of many brownfields 
development projects.   
Despite these benefits, in 2012 California Governor Jerry Brown 
ultimately succeeded in dissolving all RDAs as part of a statewide 
emergency budget deficit plan.1
II. Brownfields Development
  Though the plan ultimately led to an influx 
of millions of dollars in additional tax revenue for the state, the 
accompanying dissolution of RDAs left many in local communities 
wondering, “What next?”  Though a number of recent legislative efforts have 
attempted to solve, or at least improve, the legal and financial issues 
created by the sudden dissolution of RDAs, many hurdles remain. 
Stakeholders in brownfields development continue to face a number of 
impediments, and legislation has thus far failed to provide adequate 
remedies.  The future of brownfields projects likely requires renewed 
endeavors by partners in these projects, and a reshaping of the field in a 
world without RDAs. 
As an environmental and land use planning label, the term
“brownfields” has quickly gained currency the past 20 years as a popular 
buzzword in urban development.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) officially defines brownfields as “real property, the expansion, 
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or 
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”2  
These properties are frequently the prior sites of industrial factories and 
waste disposal plants, and often take up prime real estate.  Some estimates 
show over 450,000 brownfields sites existing in the U.S.3  Of these 
brownfields, the EPA estimates that over 90,000 lay idle in the state of 
California alone, while some private researchers estimate  upwards of 
117,000 such brownfields sites in the state.4
1. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.dof.ca.gov/redevelopment. 
  As populations swell across the 
2. Brownfields, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
3. Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields/basic_info.htm#plan. 
4. Brownfields Home Page, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/
brownfields/; Corynn Brodsky, How Many Brownfields Does California Have?, CENTER FOR 
CREATIVE LAND RECYCLING (2007), available at http://www.cclr.org/media/publications/ 
How%20Many%20Brownfields%20Does%20California%20Have.pdf. 
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nation, especially in dense city spaces, urban infill continues to gain in 
popularity as an attractive, and perhaps necessary, means of 
redevelopment.5  Government agencies and private developers alike look to 
redevelop unused properties within city boundaries, rather than disturb 
more pristine undeveloped properties and greenspaces.6
A. The Benefits of Brownfields Development
  
By cleaning up contaminated sites so that the property can be 
productively used, many brownfield redevelopment projects, whether public, 
private, or both, have positively affected surrounding communities’ 
economic growth, social and neighborhood revitalization efforts, and 
environmental restoration.  The vast majority of brownfields sites have 
negative residual land values before clean up efforts.7,8  However, once 
restored, brownfields contribute tax revenue to the state, as well as income 
tax, business tax and utility tax revenues.9  The EPA estimates that each 
dollar of public funds invested in brownfields development leverages at 
least $2.50 in private investment, and that every acre of brownfields cleaned 
and reused saves four and a half acres of open and undeveloped space, i.e., 
space that has no buildings and is often accessible to the public.10
Further, such projects have a number of more localized benefits.  They 
not only stimulate local job growth both during and after completion of the 
remediation, but often increase the property values of surrounding homes.
   
11  
In addition, brownfields redevelopment has social benefits as well, turning 
community eyesores into attractive hubs and encouraging the general 
holistic health of neighborhoods.12
5. Henry Mayer & Michael Greenberg, Coming Back from Economic Despair: Case
Studies of Small- and Medium-Size American Cities, 20 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY
232 (2001). 
   
6. Id.
7. Brownfields Program Achievements Linked to Early Success, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Oct. 2006), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P100829D.pdf. 
8. GROUP MCKENZIE, Brownfield/Greenfield Development Cost Comparison Study (2004),
available at http://www.portofportland.com/PDFPOP/Trade_Trans_Studies_Brnfld_Stdy_ 
Exec_Smry.pdf. 
9. Id.
10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 7.
11. Corrin J. Breeding, Socio-Economic Revitalization Through Brownfield Reclamation
(2012) (Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Tennessee), available at http://trace. 
tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2486&context=utk_gradthes. 
12. Id.
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Finally, brownfields redevelopment may have unique, benefits for 
California’s future energy production.  The EPA believes that many 
brownfields locations may serve as useful sites for new renewable energy 
projects, and recently created an online tool through which public and 
private developers may search for contaminated sites in California that are 
potential candidates for such renewable energy development.13  The EPA 
also recently launched the “RE-Powering America’s Lands” initiative to 
encourage such renewable energy development on contaminated land sites 
throughout the United States.14
B. Economic and Legal Challenges
   
Despite the large potential benefits of brownfields reuse, both the 
costs associated with the identification and cleanup procedures at such 
sites and the potential liability associated with ownership and/or 
involvement with these properties present large hurdles to this kind of 
development.  These costs include the price of construction and 
remediation and a higher risk premium, which affects the price of 
contracting insurance for the site.15  As a result of the high cost and 
potential legal liability of brownfields reuse, many private developers are 
hesitant to develop such spaces.16  Among developers, a common belief 
persists that undeveloped greenspace and uncontaminated areas remain 
easier and more lucrative to develop, despite their sizable distances from 
population centers and attached to an altogether different set of extraneous 
costs.17  A number of complementary federal and state statutes present 
significant legal hurdles to brownfields remediation as well.  Federal 
environmental law, most notably the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), passed by Congress 
in 1980 to address serious environmental concerns with the improper 
disposal of hazardous substances at sites throughout the country, puts 
various constraints on brownfields development.18
13. Renewable Energy on Contaminated Lands in California, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/region9/climatechange/renewcontlands. 
  CERCLA expanded the 
federal government’s ability to appropriately identify and investigate 
hazardous waste releases at some of the most contaminated sites in the 
14. Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially Contaminated Land and Mine Sites, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa. 
15. GROUP MCKENZIE, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/super
fund/policy/cercla.htm. 
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country, and thus better remediate contaminants endangering the 
environment and the public’s health.19  Towards this end, CERCLA created a 
three-pronged approach to hazardous waste cleanup that: (1) enacted 
substantive law concerning abandoned hazardous waste sites; (2) 
established a trust fund, funded primarily by taxing the oil and chemical 
industries, providing for cleanup when no responsible party could be found; 
and (3) established liability for those ultimately responsible for the release 
and transport of such hazardous waste.20  While the law predominantly 
focuses on the most contaminated areas, otherwise known as Superfund 
sites, CERCLA’s substantive provisions also apply to brownfields.21
CERCLA’s third prong establishes strict liability for those responsible 
for the release and disposal of hazardous substances into the environment 
by persons and businesses deemed “potentially responsible parties” 
(“PRPs”).
   
22  This liability encompasses owners and operators of the property, 
any person who owned the facility at which such substances were disposed, 
any person who arranged for the disposal of the hazardous substances, 
and/or any person who transported such substances for disposal.23  The 
government may hold any of the above parties strictly liable for all costs of 
removal incurred by both federal and state governments, as well as 




As enacted, CERCLA admittedly discouraged the private development 
of brownfield sites because of the potential imposition of strict liability for 
environmental contamination.25
19. Id.
  As PRPs, many property owners and 
developers feared undertaking the high risks of developing brownfields sites, 
since they could be held financially responsible for both cleanup costs and 
damages.  In response, many owners left sites idle rather than redevelop 
20. Id.
21. INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: 
A GUIDEBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 2001), available at 
http://www.usmayors.org/brownfields/library/Brownfields_Redevelopment.pdf. 
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2014).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Steven M. Sommers & Michelle C. Kales, Acquiring and Disposing of Environmentally
Contaminated Property, Colo. Law., March 2005, at 11. 
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their properties and thus open themselves up to liability for cleanup costs.26
The EPA took a large step towards developing brownfields in 1995 with 
the creation of the “Brownfields Program” dedicated solely to the 
remediation and development of such sites.
  
Noticing this, agency decisionmakers quickly took various steps to 
encourage brownfields development despite the liabilities imposed by 
CERCLA.   
27  The program encouraged the 
“sustainab[le] reuse” of former brownfields sites, with peripheral goals of 
adding tax revenue and job growth in addition to the more typical goals of 
improving human health and environment at such sites.28  The EPA has 
declared that its goals in brownfields development include protecting the 
environment, reducing blight, and steering development away from 
greenfields and working lands.29  Since 1995, the EPA estimates that the 
Brownfields Program has leveraged more than $14 billion in brownfields 
cleanup and redevelopment funding from the private and public sectors and 
over 60,000 jobs.30
In more recent attempts to alleviate CERCLA’s negative effects on 
brownfields development, Congress passed the Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act of 2002 (“Federal Brownfields 
Amendments”).
   
31  The Federal Brownfields Amendments sought to protect 
small businesses looking to develop brownfields from potential liability 
under CERCLA.32  The Act protects any purchaser of a brownfields site from 
federal liability for cleanup costs when it qualifies as a “Bona Fide 
Prospective Purchaser” (“BFPP”), thus encouraging such purchasers to buy 
brownfields properties.33  To qualify as a BFPP, however, the law imposes a 
number of significant hurdles, and a potential developer must have: 
(1) purchased the property after January 1, 2002;
(2) purchased a property at which all disposal of hazardous
waste occurred before such an acquisition;
26. Flannery P. Collins, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 303, 311 (2003). 
27. Brodsky, supra note 5.
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
supra note 3. 
29. Brownfields, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields. 
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
supra note 3. 
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9628 (West 2014).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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(3) made all necessary and appropriate inquiries into any
prior owners of the brownfield site, in accordance with
accepted commercial and customary standards;
(4) gave all legally required notices with respect to hazardous
substances on the property
(5) acted with appropriate care with respect to these
substances by taking steps to stop any continuing release;
prevent future releases; and prevent exposure to such
released substances;
(6) given full cooperation, assistance and access to the
property by federal and/or state agencies;
(7) complied with any land use or institutional controls
concerning the property;
(8) complied with any administrative subpoenas; and
(9) shown him or herself unaffiliated with any other person
potentially liable for costs of hazardous waste cleanup at
the site, whether through familial or contractual
relationships.34
The Federal Brownfields Amendments provides additional protections to 
properties remediated pursuant to a voluntary state cleanup program; these 
kinds of sites are exempted to a large extent from future EPA enforcement 
actions and also qualify for deferral of federal enforcement of CERCLA’s 
provisions.35  Private developers may assert a BFPP defense to liability for 
cleanup costs, though these brownfields developers do bear the burden of 
proof when asserting this type of defense.36  For instance, developers must 
comply with detailed EPA regulations regarding making the acceptable 
“appropriate inquiries” into the previous ownership and use of the property, 
including making these inquiries within one year of acquisition of the 
property, reviewing state and local records, and gathering declarations by 
environmental professionals as to the current contamination of the 
property.37
At the federal level, the EPA’s Land Revitalization Initiative fully 
recognizes that these regulatory actions are part of a growing trend towards 




34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2014).
  The EPA created the initiative in 2003 to build on its earlier efforts 
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b) (2014).
36. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 692, 749
(D.S.C. 2010). 
37. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 312 – 312.31 (2006).
38. ALAN BERGER, DESIGNING THE RECLAIMED LANDSCAPE 142 (2008).
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to address the reuse of contaminated properties, and “instill a culture of 
land reuse” throughout the country.39 40
II. History of Brownfields Development In California
   
As mentioned in Part I, infra, California is home to a large number of
brownfields, tens of thousands of which lay idle.  In California, the 
Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) is the primary agency 
tasked with overseeing brownfields development.41  One of DTSC’s most 
potent tools for the appropriate development of environmentally hazardous 
sites is its ability to place limits on future uses of property based on the 
level of cleanup necessary at the site.42  Parcels of land with such title 
prohibitions are known as “Land Use Restricted Sites.”43
Acting in its more proactive capacities, DTSC has cleaned up various 
brownfields sites through its Site Mitigation and Brownfields Reuse Program 
(“SMBRP”).  Typically, DTSC completes an average of 125 cleanups per year, 
and oversees more than 200 per year.
  This categorization 
encompasses many brownfields, whose titles generally have land use 
restrictions on them due to the presence of hazardous substances.   
44  DTSC works closely with the 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards (“Water Boards”), whose primary 
function is facilitating the cleanup of hazardous substances that could 
adversely affect water quality.45  However, DTSC does not receive enough 
funding to remediate any significant number of brownfields sites in 
California, evident in DTSC’s limits on grants for developers at $200,000 
cleanup grants and $200,000 revolving loan fund grants per site to qualified 
entities.46
39. Id.
  DTSC’s internal financial failings and lack of organization 
compound this lack of funding; an agency audit in May 2013 revealed that 
DTSC had over $185 million in unrecovered costs from responsible parties. 
Although the agency is now engaged in cost recovery efforts, this dollar 
40. EPA’s Land Revitalization Action Agenda, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 9,
2012), http://www.epa.gov/landrevitalization/agenda_full.htm. 




44. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, supra note 41.
45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS STATE REPORT REGION 9, available at
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/state_tribal/update2011/bf_states_report_r9.pdf. 
46. 2012 Brownfields Funding Workshop, DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL (May 7,
2012), www.dtsc.ca/gov/sitecleanup/brownfields/upload/bffunding_workshop_2012-2.pdf. 
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amount indicates the general state of affairs in the DTSC.47  Until 2012, RDAs 
largely filled this void, and were responsible for the successful development 
of a large percentage of remediated brownfields sites in California.48
A. The Role of the Redevelopment Agency
 
The California legislature established RDAs in 1945 in order to 
redevelop blighted areas using public funds, in turn serving compelling state 
interests.49  Although no concrete definition of “blight” exists, the California 
Health and Safety Code includes a non-exhaustive list of the physical and 
economic conditions that constitute a “blighted area.”50  These conditions 
include the presence of unsafe and dilapidated buildings, stagnant property 
values, properties contaminated by hazardous waste, and abnormally high 
numbers of abandoned commercial and residential buildings.51  Prior to the 
dissolution of RDAs in 2012, state law gave local governments authority to 
create RDAs in order to revitalize and redevelop these kinds of deteriorated 
areas.52  Once formed, such agencies were primarily responsible for creating 
redevelopment plans and providing initial funding for such plans in the 
hopes of attracting private investment.53
The initial funding for RDAs flowed largely from tax increment funding 
(“TIF”), a lending model based on increasing expectations of property tax 
values resulting from redevelopment activities.
   
54  TIF stems from the value 
capture strategy utilized in public financing, whereby the government 
attempts to “capture” the increases in private land values generated by 
public investment.55
47. Memorandum from Director Deborah O. Raphael to Secretary for Environmental 
Protection of the California Environmental Protection Agency Matt Rodriguez (May 
30, 2013), available at http://dtsc.ca.gov/upload/FISMAMay2013.pdf. 
  These increases in value are most commonly the 
increased tax revenue from improved infrastructure and transit options near 
48. INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 21.
49. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014).
50. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33031 (West 2014).
51. Id.
52. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014).
53. Frequently Asked Questions About Redevelopment In California, CALIFORNIA 
REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, http://www.calredevelop.org/external/wcpages/wcwebcontent/ 
webcontentpage.aspx?contentid=266. 
54. Id.
55. Featured Topic: Value Capture, RECONNECTING AMERICA (2013), http://www.
reconnectingamerica.org/resource-center/value-capture/. 
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a land parcel or, at issue here, the tax increases from the use of remediated 
brownfields sites for more productive ends.56
Under the TIF model as used in California, once a community or 
municipality creates a redevelopment area and/or project, the local agency 
immediately “freezes” property tax revenue at the base level established in 
that fiscal year.
   
57  For the life of the redevelopment project (generally limited 
to 50 years), the local government automatically diverts any extra property 
tax revenue generated above this base level to the local RDA as tax-
increment revenue.  Only two requirements were imposed upon this funding 
to RDAs: (1) that 22% of the revenue be “passed through” to other local 
agencies, including counties, school districts and cities; and (2) that 20% of 
the RDA’s revenue go to funding low- and moderate-income housing.58  
Simply put, TIF allowed for public and private investors to borrow against 
projected future tax revenue.59  By 2010, RDAs in California were receiving 
around $5 billion annually through TIF efforts.60  TIF became the single 
largest source of funding for affordable housing projects in the state.61  As 
will be discussed further in Part III.B, though TIF was instrumental in 
brownfields and affordable housing development, it did divert varoius funds 
from other city and county agencies, such as school districts, a reality that 
would open these kinds of financing efforts up to intense criticism.62
Through TIF and other efforts, RDAs helped facilitate brownfields 
development by securing funding that may not have otherwise been 





In regards to financing, RDAs consistently bore the brunt of the initial cost 
of brownfields development projects and assumed much of the legal risk 
involved with projects.  The State and RDAs offered potential developers a 
wide range of financial help, including revolving loan funds, tax-free bonds, 
57. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, SHOULD CALIFORNIA END 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES? (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/ 
2011/realignment/redevelopment_020911.pdf. 
58. Id. at 2.
59. RESTORING PROSPERITY, STATE POLICY PACKAGE: STATE-FACILITATED TIF TO 
ENCOURAGE BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.restoringprosperity. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/brownfieldtifpackage.pdf. 
60. TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Value Capture, CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.
housingpolicy.org/toolbox/strategy/policies/capture_value.html?tierid=113458. 
62. Id.
63. Leah Goldberg, Brownfields Development After the Death of Redevelopment Agencies
in California, EPA Region 9 Brownfields Workshop (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/workshop/pdf-2012/RDAs_Goldberg_11_8_12.pdf. 
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private debt funds and grant money.64  A substantial percentage of this 
money came directly from TIF monies in RDA accounts.65 
B. The Polanco Act
Along with the substantial financial backing RDAs put towards 
brownfields remediation, California state law afforded special protections to 
these agencies.  Even when adequate funding is available to purchase a 
brownfields site, a developer is still vulnerable to a number of potential 
legal liabilities, presenting an additional hurdle to development.  Although 
various escape valves exist, for instance the liability protections codified in 
the relevant environmental and land use statutes, private parties still 
struggle to meet these laws’ stringent remediation, monitoring, and reuse 
requirements.66  In addition, even these protections are often criticized for 
their “unbalanced impact” on parties who have contributed in only minimal 
ways towards site contamination.67
To further encourage brownfields development, California took a 
unique step by passing the Polanco Redevelopment Act (“Polanco Act”) in 
1990, putting it at the forefront of brownfields development.
   
68  Legislators 
passed multiple state laws such as the Polanco Act in order to ease the 
potential of liability on private developers, as well as to empower RDAs to 
better facilitate environmental site investigation and cleanup of 
brownfields.69  The Polanco Act authorized RDAs to take a variety of actions 
to remedy the releases of hazardous substances from brownfields, including 
requiring third-party property owners to either clean such waste materials 
from their sites or pay the local RDA the entire costs of such a cleanup.70  
After some revisions, the Polanco Act took the national CERCLA liability 
framework and applied it to RDA’s abilities to conduct local site cleanups 
and development projects.71
64. GROUP MCKENZIE, supra note 
  The law also authorized RDAs themselves to 
8. 
65. Id.
66. Collins, supra note 26, at 309.
67. Id.
68. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 33459 to 33459.8.
69. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25395.60 to 25395.105, 33459 to
33459.8 (West 2014). 
70. Id.
71. Richard Opper, Eminent Domain and the Polanco Redevelopment Act, ENVIROLAWYER, 
available at www.envirolawyer.com/Polanco_Power_Point.ppt. 
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bring civil actions against responsible polluting parties to compel the 
cleanup of contamination within the brownfields site.72
The Act created a species of civil action claims for RDAs, allowing 
these agencies to take direct legal action against the most reticent polluters. 
The new law authorized RDAs to investigate all contaminated sites within 
larger redevelopment areas, and subsequently issue 60-day notices to 
property owners detailing hazardous waste cleanup requirements.
   
73  
Property owners then had 60 days to propose a remedial action plan that 
would cover the cleanup.  If property owners did not propose a plan, the 
local RDA could move ahead with its own action plan, and recoup the full 
costs of implementation from the responsible parties.74
Under the Polanco Act, RDAs could also recoup attorneys’ fees from 
the polluting parties, another highly valuable tool for brownfields 
development.
   
75  This provision was a useful instrument for RDAs, and 
encouraged such agencies to incur the full costs of pursuing civil actions 
against large polluters who may have previously been willing to spend large 
amounts on litigation in order to draw out the legal process.76
In addition to relief from attorneys fees, the Polanco Act provided 
immunity from state and local liability to both RDAs and subsequent 
property purchasers, including persons whom entered into agreements with 
RDAs to redevelop brownfields properties and persons whom provided 
financing to the current or subsequent property owner.
  The provision 
allowed RDAs to take on such parties and effectively remediate many 
brownfields sites at little cost to the state government. 
77  This limited 
immunity would not extend towards any parties responsible for the release 
of hazardous substances from such properties.78
The provisions of the Polanco Act also worked in tandem with eminent 
domain, further facilitating brownfields redevelopment.  Because acquiring 
property for RDA projects was considered a valid public use, local courts 
allowed RDAs to use eminent domain to further along such property 
  
72. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.3 (West 2014); Redevelopment Agency
of City of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4th 912, 916 (2003). 
73. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.1 (West 2014).
74. See id.
75. Cal. Health & Safety Code. § 33459.4 (West 2014).
76. Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 103 (2003). 
77. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.3 (West 2014).
78. Id.
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acquisitions.79  However, the provision that eminent domain could only be 
used by RDAs in blighted areas constrained this power.80
Since 1990, the Polanco Act has become a powerful tool for RDAs, who 
used the protections to aid in the clean up and restoration of blighted and 
toxic properties.
   
81  The DTSC and the former California Redevelopment 
Agency jointly developed a prototype Environmental Oversight Agreement 
(“EOA”) to further cement the protections of the Polanco Act.82  Under the 
DTSC’s guidance, RDA’s were exempted from DTSC’s legal requirements for 
“Voluntary Cleanup Agreements” entered into with private developers; most 
importantly, DTSC allowed RDAs to supervise and lead brownfields cleanups 
without designation as a “responsible party,” thus exempting RDAs from 
strict liability under federal and state environmental statutes.83
Many former brownfield sites in California were developed primarily 
through RDA actions and partnerships based on financial and legal 
benefits—developments that many have argued were highly successful in 
both remedying contaminated sites and turning delinquent properties into 
revitalized community spaces improving both tax revenue and quality of 
life.
 
84  A recent study on RDAs, sponsored by the California Redevelopment 
Agency, found numerous economic benefits flowing from RDA projects.  The 
study concluded that RDAs generated $40 billion in total economic activity 
between 2006 and 2007, have created over 300,000 part- and full-time jobs, 
and have increased California’s state income by $22 billion since their 
creation.85
C. Case Study: Emeryville, California
 
One highly-touted example of a successful RDA project is in the city of 
Emeryville, California, located just across the bay from San Francisco. 
Formerly a large vacant and contaminated area that had been highly 
79. Redevelopment Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 95 Cal. App. 4th 309,
314 (2001); see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014). 
80. Redevelopment Agency of Chula Vista, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 314.
81. RICHARD DOTY, COX CASTLE NICHOLSON LLP, REDEVELOPING BROWNFIELDS USING 
THE POLANCO ACT, available at http://www.coxcastle.com/images/ps_attachment/attach 
ment109.pdf. 
82. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL 
OVERSIGHT AGREEMENT, (2004), available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Brown 
fields/upload/SMBRP_FS_EOA.pdf. 
83. Id.
84. INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 21.
85. Gallo and Koehler, The Impact of Fiscal 2006-07 Community Redevelopment
Agency Activities on the California Economy, California Redevelopment Agency, June 2009. 
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industrial in nature, various Emeryville sites have since been transformed 
into a booming town complete with shopping mall, restaurants and high-
density housing.  The Polanco Act was instrumental in the RDA’s acquisition 
of property and subsequent cleaning up of the brownfield areas in 
Emeryville.86  The local RDA expended $25 million to acquire the property 
and $11 million to fully remediate the land, thus taking a $36-million risk in 
developing Emeryville.87  This is a substantial amount of money, and a risk 
likely too large for a single private investor.88  Though the initial funds for 
remediation came directly from the local RDA, 90% of these funds were 
ultimately recovered through use of the Polanco Act’s financial remedies.89  
As a result of the RDA’s investment in brownfields sites in Emeryville, by 
2002 new development had generated $5.4 million in tax increment funding 
per year, over 8,400 new jobs had been created, and the total value of 
development was estimated at $513 million.90  These benefits accrued to an 
area that had only years before been considered “blighted,” and filled with 
properties contributing zero or negative tax funding to the city.  City officials 
note that such a successful project would not have come to fruition without 
RDAs and the protections and powers of the Polanco Act.91
IV. Post-Matosantos: the Demise of Redevelopment
Agencies in California
   
Assembly Bill 1X 26 (“AB 1X 26”) and the lawsuit that followed spelled
the official end of RDAs in the state, despite these organizations’ central role 
in a large number of redevelopment successes.92  The California Supreme 
Court’s decision in California Redevelopment Association, et al. v. Matosantos 
completely dissolved RDAs over one year ago.93
86. Doty, supra note 
  Governor Brown’s proposed 





90. LIZ CONNOLLY, PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, BUILDING MUNICIPAL CAPACITY 
FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT IN WELLSTON, MISSOURI AND EMERYVILLE, CALIFORNIA: A
CASE STUDY (2004), available at http://pprc.umsl.edu/pprc.umsl.edu/data/connolly_occ 
paper9.pdf. 
91. Amber Evans & Marcus Nieback, How We Marketed and Developed Partnerships
for Reuse of Emeryville Brownfields, EPA REGION 9 BROWNFIELDS WORKSHOP, (Nov. 8, 2012), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/workshop/pdf-2012/Marketed_Dev 
elop_Reuse_Nieback_11_8.pdf. 
92. Cal. Redevelopment Agency Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
93. Id.
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included the dissolution of all RDAs in the state and the redistribution of 
their funds to other local agencies.94  These legislative actions came in the 
midst of severe cuts to higher education, social welfare programs and state 
agencies caused by the state budget deficit.95  The California Supreme court 
decided Matosantos in the midst of the state budget crisis; when Governor 
Jerry Brown was elected in 2010, California’s 2010-11 budget deficit was 
projected at $26 billion.96
These bills attempted to remedy these kinds of funding deficits by 
redistributing TIF revenues from RDAs to county auditor-controllers for 
subsequent distribution to cities, counties and school districts.
   
97  AB 1X 26 
mandated the immediate dissolution of RDAs, and AB 1X 27 would have 
allowed cities to create alternative redevelopment agencies.98  The proposed 
cuts largely sprung from a report published by the Legislative Analyst Office 
(“LAO”) in February 2011 that detailed alleged financial problems with the 
redevelopment agency system.99  The LAO study found that RDAs’ share of 
local property taxes had grown from 2% to 12% since the agencies’ inception 
over 60 years earlier.100  As mentioned in Part II.B, infra, the report also found 
that by 2010 RDAs were receiving over $5 billion in TIF.101
Opponents of AB 1X 26 quickly filed for a writ of mandate triggering 
the Matosantos lawsuit.
  
102  Plaintiffs argued that Governor Brown’s proposed 
measures dissolving RDAs violated Proposition 22, a state Constitutional 
measure which limited the state’s ability to require RDAs to make payments 
on the state’s behalf for the state’s benefit.103
94. TAYLOR, supra note 
  Voters had recently passed 
Proposition 22 largely through efforts by the California League of Cities, a 
major funder, and the law amended the Constitution so as to specifically to 
prevent the state from delaying the distribution of tax revenue from 
transportation and redevelopment, e.g., locally imposed tax revenue, even in 
57. 
95. Adam Nagourney, For California, a New Month, a New Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18calif.html. 
96. Adam Nagourney, Back From the Fiscal Abyss, California Balances Its Budget, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/us/california-balances-
its-budget.html?_r=0. 
97. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 250.
98. Id. at 241.




102. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 252.
103. Id.
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the midst of financial hardship.104
Ultimately, the Court held that because RDAs are “creatures of the 
Legislature’s exercise of its statutory power,” the Legislature can both 
expand and limit RDAs’ functions, including mandating their complete 
dissolution.
  In Matosantos, the California Supreme 
Court soundly rejected these arguments. 
105  The Court began with a lengthy analysis of the history of 
public and municipal funding and redevelopment agencies in California.106  
The Court also found that no explicit provision in the California Constitution 
mandated RDAs’ continued existence, and no clear evidence of legislative 
intent demonstrated otherwise.107  The Court struck the side bill AB 1X 27 
law down as unconstitutional.108
After the Matosantos ruling, AB 1X 26 was put into full force, and 
legislators and government officials made a number of changes to 
California’s Health and Safety Code in order to effectuate the dissolution of 
RDAs.  First, the new law required that “all authority, rights, powers, duties, 
and obligations previously vested with the former redevelopment agencies” 
be immediately vested with successor agencies (“SAs”).
 
109  The law makes 
each newly created SA responsible for payment of all obligations entered 
into by its prior RDA, a procedure organized by “Recognized Obligation 
Payment Schedules.”110  Enforceable obligations include, but are not limited 
to: bonds, loans legally taken out by RDAs, payments required by the federal 
government, preexisting obligations to the state or obligations imposed by 
state law, court-imposed judgments against prior RDAs, and contracts 
necessary for the administration of SAs.111
However, the dissolution statute bar cities and counties from 
classifying any agreements and arrangements between the city or county 
that created the RDA and the former RDA, and/or contracts between the 
former RDA and other public agencies to perform services outside the 
redevelopment area, as enforceable obligations requiring ongoing 
   
104. Proposition 22, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (2012), http://californiachoices.org/
ballot-measures/proposition-22. 
105. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 256.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 260.
108. Id. at 264.
109. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34173 (West 2014).
110. See MATTHEW S. GRAY ET AL., Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies Under AB1X




111. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34171 (West 2014).
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payment.112  Examples of non-enforceable obligations include plans, 
statements of intent, designations of redevelopment project areas, one-way 
commitments by the former RDA without any parties other than the local 
agency, and contracts that are too vague.113
The new law also originally required SAs to sell off all land and assets 
previously held by RDAs as “expeditiously” as possible and “in a manner 
aimed at maximizing value.”
 
114  A later bill, Assembly Bill 1484 (“AB 1484”), 
amended the Health and Safety Code to include more direction for SAs in 
regards to these lands, and gave more flexibility to SAs for the continued 
ownership of such properties.115
Cities and municipalities must return all remaining funds after RDA 
dissolutions to the California Department of Finance for redistribution to 
public agencies and school districts.
  Even so, in many respects, SAs’ collective 
hands are tied: although required by law to sell properties for the maximal 
value and in the shortest time possible, many RDAs held contaminated 
properties that will likely sell for next to nothing, if anything at all.  If the SAs 
cannot sell these blighted sites, they will likely be stuck holding onto them. 
However, unlike the predecessor RDAs, SAs so far lack the legal protections 
the Polanco Act afford to RDAs to preemptively cleanup brownfields 
properties themselves and then recoup the costs of such cleanups from the 
private responsible parties.  Further, if SAs cannot finish the brownfields 
cleanups initiated by RDAs, they are unlikely to achieve the goals of state 
law in generating more revenue for the state through the dissolution of 
RDAs.  Unfortunately, AB 1X 26 and its recent changes are silent on this 
matter. 
116  The California Supreme Court’s 
original stay of the implementation of AB 1X 26 increased the amount of 
local funds due back to the state.  While the bill itself lay dormant, cities 
continued to gather property tax revenues throughout the 2011-12 fiscal 
year, many of which the Department of Finance (“DOF”) claims were 
misallocated to inappropriate entities.117
112. Id.
  In July 2012, the DOF forced SAs to 
choose to either make a complete “true up” payment, consisting of paying 
back the entirety of funds allegedly misappropriated during the year, or face 
113. Redevelopment Agency Dissolution Under ABx1 26, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., http://www.
dof.ca.gov/redevelopment/RDA_dissolution_QandA/common_issues/view.php (last up 
dated Nov. 28, 2012). 
114. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34181 (West 2014).
115. Id.
116. MATTHEW S. GRAY ET AL., supra note 110.
117. ABx1 26 Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., http://www.dof.
ca.gov/assembly_bills_26-27. 
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severe penalties from the state.118
Health and Safety Code section 34175(b) set February 1, 2012, as the 
definitive date for the transfer of RDA assets to the applicable SAs, and on 
January 31, 2012, all RDAs officially closed.
  This process has left many cities and 
municipalities in deep debt to the state. 
119  Although state government 
experts had projected $3.2-billion in General Fund savings from the 
dissolution of RDAs, numbers pulled from the LAO report, more recent 
estimates project that the state will save $1.8 billion less than originally 
assumed in the 2012-13 budget, for a total of $1.4 billion in savings.120
V. The Question Remains – How To Redevelop
Brownfields?
   
With the demise of RDAs came the demise of the associated benefits
conferred upon them by the Polanco Act and other key legislation, leaving a 
clear void in public redevelopment work.  The role of SAs as true successors 
to RDAs is still largely unsettled, including whether or not the legal liability 
protections afforded RDAs extend to such new agencies.  A glaring question 
is whether the Polanco Act applies to the SAs created in the wake of defunct 
RDAs, or whether its protections apply only to these now-dead agencies.  In 
addition, questions remain regarding whether SAs and cities will be unable 
to attract the requisite funding to both finish preexisting redevelopment 
projects and begin new projects, leaving brownfields sites polluted and 
underutilized. 
A. Extending Legal Protections
The text of the Polanco Act explicitly spells out that its tools and 
liability protections apply only to property located in redevelopment areas—
areas which were traditionally created and maintained by RDAs.121
118. Id.
  The Act 
was instrumental in brownfields development in California during its 22-year 
existence, and its protections should not cease to exist solely due to the 
dissolution of RDAs.  Many advocates recognize this stance, and towards 
this end, in 2011 State Representative Roger Hernandez introduced 
119. Goldberg, supra note 59.
120. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013-14 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S 
FISCAL OUTLOOK (2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/bud/fiscal-outlook/ 
fiscal-outlook-2012.aspx. 
121. Kristina Lawson & Craig Moyer, Unintended Environmental Consequences of the
Demise of Redevelopment in California, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS (April 12, 2012), http:// 
www.environmentalleader.com/2012/04/16/unintended-environmental-consequences-of-
the-demise-of-redevelopment-in-california. 
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Assembly Bill 1235, which would have extended the immunities of the 
Polanco Act to SAs looking to finish preexisting RDA brownfields 
development projects.122  Although the State Legislature ultimately passed 
the bill, by this time various political forces had transformed it from a bill 
concerning the Polanco Act into a bill about energy efficiency, and the 
legislature amended its text in August 2012 to remove any extension of the 
Polanco Act’s protections to SAs.123
In 2012 Senator Fran Pavley introduced Senate Bill 1335 to authorize 
SAs to retain control of brownfields sites.
  
124  The bill provides in relevant 
part that:  
a successor agency may, subject to the approval of an oversight 
board pursuant to Section 34180, retain land of property 
obtained by the former redevelopment agency that is a 
brownfield site for the purpose of the remediation or removal of 
the release of hazardous substances . . . using available 
financing, funds obtained from a responsible party, existing state 
or federal grants, or any other funds at the disposal of the 
successor agency in order to maximize value of the asset.  Upon 
completion of the remediation or removal of hazardous 
substances from the brownfield site, the successor agency shall 
dispose of the property pursuant to paragraph (1).125  
Throughout April and May of 2012, the Senate Environmental Quality, 
Governance and Finance and Appropriation Committees all passed SB 
1335.126  However, while the Senate Appropriations Committee held the bill, 
it became inactive on November 11, 2012.127
Assembly Bill 1484 (“AB 1484”), passed in June of 2012, represents 
another recent development in the post-RDA world.  The act amended state 
law, providing that “[a]ny existing cleanup plans and liability limits 
 




124. See Post-Redevelopment Legislation Update, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES (April
19, 2012), http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/News-Articles/2012/April/Post-Redevelop 
ment-Legislation-Update. 
125. SB 1335, Cal. Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at
http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/text.html?bvid=20110SB133596AMD. 
126. See SB 1335 - Redevelopment: brownfield sites, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
INFORMATION, available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml. 
127. Id.
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authorized under the Polanco Redevelopment Act . . . [s]hall be transferred 
to the successor agency and may be transferred to the successor housing 
entity at that entity’s request.”128  AB 1484 made several helpful changes to 
state law that are pertinent to the management and remediation of 
brownfields properties.  AB 1484 modified AB 1x 26 to require that each SA 
submit a Long-Range Property Management Plan detailing the SA’s 
inventory and planned use of the former RDA’s properties.129  Such plans 
must include detailed descriptions of the historic environmental 
contamination on the site, including the site’s previous designation as a 
brownfield.130
Going forward, permissible uses of properties include the retention of 
the property for governmental use pursuant to subdivision (a) of the Health 
& Safety Code section 34181, the retention of the property for future 
development, the sale of the property, and/or the use of the property to 
fulfill an enforceable obligation.”
  
131  SAs may transfer properties categorized 
for “government use” under section 34191.5, including properties used for 
governmental purposes, including roads, school buildings, parks, libraries 
and local agency buildings, to the appropriate public jurisdictions.132  
Property, including brownfields sites, may be transferred from an SA to the 
local City if a formerly approved redevelopment plan exists.133
Although this law may seem to solve the problem of limiting liability 
for public entities in redevelopment of brownfields, many questions remain. 
Section 34173(e) established that the liability of SAs “shall be limited to the 
extent of the total sum of property tax revenues it receives pursuant to this 
part and the value of assets transferred to it as a successor agency for a 
dissolved redevelopment agency.”
 
134  Unfortunately, the successor city or 
county may not take actions that would increase in any way the size, 
boundaries or obligated property tax necessary for enforceable obligations 
authorized as of June 27, 2011.135  Although section 34173(i) of the Health 
and Safety Code provides that the city and/or county may request all land 
use-related plans and functions of the former redevelopment agency, 
anything created for redevelopment purposes after June 27, 2011, is 
considered null under the new law.136
128. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34173(f) (West 2014).
   
129. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34191.5 (West 2014).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34181 (West 2014).
133. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34191 (West 2014).
134. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34173(e) (West 2014).
135. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34173(i) (West 2014).
136. Id.
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These provisions allow SAs, cities and counties to continue work on 
preexisting redevelopment plans for brownfields, but do freeze any 
brownfields development essentially as it existed on June 27, 2011.  SAs may 
not pursue new funding, nor take any actions that may increase debt.  The 
SAs may only issue bonds under preexisting enforceable obligations carried 
over from the prior RDAs.137  Moreover, it is not clear how these new 
provisions work with conflicting AB 1X 26 provisions such as its section 
34163(b), which prohibits successor agencies of any kind from entering into 
new redevelopment contracts, including remediation and rehabilitation.138
B. Alternative Funding
 
Even if the legal liability protections from the Polanco Act do indeed 
transfer to SAs, a tenuous possibility, the fact remains that little funding 
exists for such agencies to effectively carry out existing cleanup plans as well 
as to engage in useful and productive value capture strategies.  Brownfields 
developers have historically depended largely on grants, loans and tax 
incentives—much of which came directly from RDAs.139  As noted in Part 
III.B, infra, RDAs based the majority, if not all, of their brownfields
redevelopment on TIF monies.  Current law bans the use of TIF, and there is
a real possibility that brownfield development projects will stall completely
due to a severe shortage of funds.  The DTSC’s Revolving Loans Fund (“RLF”)
and the EPA’s Assessment and Cleanup Grants make up the bulk of public
agency funding for brownfields development, especially those development
projects based on public-private partnerships and investment.140
Municipalities must both pay off their debt and make up the difference in
funding for future projects using creativity and a patchwork of district
financing and special taxes.141
The DTSC RLF program provides funding of up to $1 million to 
developers, businesses, schools and local governments for remediation 
projects.142
137. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34177(a) (West 2014).
  Funding may go to either public or private entities, so long as 
138. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34163(b) (West 2014).
139. Steve Dwyer, California Brownfields....and the Challenges Ahead, BROWNFIELD 
RENEWAL, http://www.brownfieldrenewal.com/news-california_brownfields....and_the_ 
challenges_ahead_-208.html. 
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they meet the program eligibility requirements.143  Unlike RDA projects 
based on TIF, RLF funds will not cover the typically substantial costs of pre-
cleanup site assessments, thus the initial environmental assessments of 
brownfields required by state and federal law must be complete at the time 
of application for RLF.144
Since 1993, DTSC has also administered the Voluntary Cleanup 
Program for brownfields designated as low-priority hazardous waste sites.
   
145  
Under this program, DTSC enters site-specific agreements with project 
developers, which include for DTSC oversight of the site’s environmental 
assessment, investigation, and remediation actions.146  The program also 
adds a “cloak of reasonableness” to developer’s actions, especially if such 
actions are evaluated in the judicial system.147  The Voluntary Cleanup 
Program requires brownfields project proponents to pay all DTSC’s 
reasonable costs for those services provided.148
EPA Assessment and Clean-up Grants are another source of funding, 
but are unavailable to private entities.
 
149  The Clean-up Grant provides for up 
to $200,000 per site to a public entity, while the Assessment Grant provides 
for up to $300,000 per site, or $1 million for a grouping of three sites.150  
These funds are only available to tribal, state, and local governments, as 
well as eligible nonprofits.151  The EPA also engages in a small number of 
free “Targeted Brownfields Assessment” for eligible public and nonprofit 
entities.152  However, to qualify for EPA funds, the applicant public agency 
must demonstrate that through its response program it will: 
(1) Make a timely survey and inventory of existing brownfields sites;
143. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, CALIFORNIA BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP 
REVOLVING LOAN FUND (RLF) PROGRAM (2008), available at http://dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/ 
Brownfields/upload/final-RLF-FACT-SHEET78-4-08-2.pdf. 
144. Id.
145. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, THE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM 
(2008), http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Brownfields/upload/BF_FS_VCP.pdf. 
146. Id.





151. Grants Funding and Assistance, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/grants.html. 
152. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TARGETED BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
(2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/pdf/Brochure-idea-final-05-
07-07.pdf.
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(2) Oversight and enforcement mechanisms exist ensuring that any
actions taken will protect the environment and public health;
(3) Mechanisms exists to provide for meaningful public participation;
and
(4) Mechanisms exist to approve cleanup plans and verify that cleanup
is complete.153
In an environment without RDAs, the fourth step is most problematic 
for future brownfields development.  Current law does not allow SAs to 
approve new cleanup plans, and even if the law is amended to allow SAs this 
capability, this type of statutory right would not as a matter of course 
include the necessary additional enforcement and oversight mechanisms 
that RDAs held. 
The California Recycle Underutilized Sites Program (“CALReUSE”) is 
another option for localities my use to fill the void left behind in brownfields 
development post-AB 1X 26.  The Legislature funded CALReUSE in 2007 
with $60 million to provide grants and forgivable loans to help fund site 
assessments, technical assistance, remedial action plans and site access to 
brownfields.154  Like other programs through the state, CALReUSE maintains 
fairly strict criteria for acceptance into the program.  The proposed 
development project must create or promote residential or mixed use 
development, be located in a designated infill area, be consistent with local 
land use plans, and have a preexisting cleanup plan approved by the 
appropriate oversight agency.155  Like the DTSC and EPA grant programs, 
CALReUSE presents similar problems for the remediation of brownfields 
through development.  The most glaring complication is the program’s 
requirement to locate the development project in a designated infill area; 
although an infill area may overlap with the boundaries of a brownfields 
site, this depends more on serendipity than a guarantee.  Even if developers 
and local governments surmount these siting challenges, at this point in 
time the CALReUSE program is largely oversubscribed, and no new 
applications are being accepted.156
A distinct option known as an infrastructure finance district (“IFD”) 
exists for cities and counties who cannot garner enough support from the 
 
153. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF BROWNFIELDS AND LAND USE REVITALIZATION,
FUNDING GUIDANCE FOR STATE AND TRIBAL RESPONSE PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2013, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/proposal_guides/FY13-128(a)-Guidance-final.pdf. 
154. CALIFORNIA STATE TREASURER’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA POLLUTION CONTROL 
FINANCING AUTHORITY, CALIFORNIA RECYCLE UNDERUTILIZED (CALREUSE) PROGRAM, available 
at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cpcfa/calreuse.asp. 
155. Id.
156. CALIFORNIA STATE TREASURER’S OFFICE, CALREUSE REMEDIATION PROGRAM,
available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cpcfa/calreuse/remediation_summary.pdf. 
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more traditional government grants and loans described above, and this 
option may be the most important source of funding for brownfields 
development in the future.  An IFD municipal funding scheme allows 
taxpayers within a specified area to vote on whether to divert part of the city 
or county’s General Fund to finance government projects.157  The Legislature 
adopted this little-used source of public funding in 1990 to allow for cities 
and counties to create IFDs, divert tax revenues to them, and issue bonds in 
order to provide citizens with better-funded public infrastructure.158  Unlike 
redevelopment areas, property within an IFD does not have to be 
categorized as “blighted.”159
However, IFD funding is limited to “public capital facilities of 
communitywide significance” which provide “significant benefits” to an area 
larger than the district itself.
   
160  These include, but importantly are not 
limited to: highways, interchanges, ramps and bridges, arterial streets, 
parking facilities, and transit facilities, sewage treatment and water 
reclamation plants and interceptor pipes, facilities for the collection and 
treatment of water for urban uses, flood control levees and dams, retention 
basins, and drainage channels, child care facilities, libraries, parks, 
recreational facilities, and open space, and facilities for the transfer and 
disposal of solid waste, including transfer stations and vehicles.161  Once 
these properties are developed, however, IFDs may not fund ongoing 
maintenance, services and repairs, or operating costs, and currently must be 
in substantially undeveloped areas.162  Further, an IFD may not encompass 
any part of a redevelopment project area previously created, which dampens 
the potential for brownfields redevelopment on such parcels.163
Despite the creative funding and liability steps taken by cities and 
municipalities across the state, current law does not make clear how 
brownfields redevelopment should best proceed in an environment where 
RDAs have ceased to exist, and their redevelopment project areas and plans 
 
157. Melissa Griffin, Infrastructure Finance District Could Be New Way to Fund
Redevelopment, S.F. EXAMINER (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/columnists/ 
2011/01/new-way-finance-redevelopment#ixzz2HukEb7I8. 
158. William Reynolds, Creating Infrastructure Financing Districts to Stimulate
Economic Development, Presentation to the California Association for Local Economic 
Development (Apr. 26, 2011), available at www.edacademy.org/wp-content/uploads/.../ 
 . 
159. Infrastructure Finance Districts, SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE (Nov. 30, 2001),
http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/committee/standing/governance/ifdinformation.htm. 
160. Cal. Gov’t Code § 53395.3 (West 2014).
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have been passed on to SAs, cities, and counties.  In this case, perhaps the 
lengthy list of prohibitions on the acceptable uses of IFD funds should also 
disappear.  Only then would IFDs represent an enticing source of future 
funding for brownfields development.  As the law currently stands, however, 
the majority of brownfields sites lay in previously created redevelopment 
sites, and are thus outside the scope of IFD funding. 
Assembly Bill 2144 (“AB 2144”), under consideration in 2012, would 
have amended existing law to make IFD funding more accessible to the 
owners of former and current redevelopment areas.164  The bill represented 
an attempt by legislators to reestablish some of the redevelopment powers 
taken away by AB 1X 26.  AB 2144 would have authorized the creation of 
infrastructure and revitalization financing districts and allowed for the issuance 
of debt with 55% voter approval instead of the two-thirds majority currently 
required.165  As part of the “revitalization,” the bill would have also 
authorized an IFD to finance projects in both current and former 
redevelopment project areas, as well as former military bases.166  The 
overarching purpose of AB 2144 was to amend existing law so that an IFD 
could fund a wider variety of projects, including brownfields restoration, the 
purchase of property for development purposes, and environmental 
mitigation efforts.167  The bill would have also extended the critical 
immunities that the Polanco Act granted IFD-initiated development 
actions.168
In September 2012, however, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed AB 2144, 
claiming that “[e]xpanding the scope of infrastructure financing districts is 
premature.  This measure would likely cause cities to focus their efforts on 
using the new tools provided by the measure instead of winding down 
redevelopment.  This would prevent the state from achieving the General 
Fund savings assumed in this year’s budget.”
   
169
However, the Legislature had another chance to amend IFD law to 
make it more accessible for new redevelopment activities exists through 
Senate Bill 33, which was introduced on December 3, 2012, by Senator 
  As a result, IFD law remains 
as it was in 1990, along with its prohibitions on funding that make the use of 
IFD for brownfields development quite challenging.   






169. Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor, AB 2144 Veto Message
(Sept. 29, 2012), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_2144_Veto_Message.pdf. 
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Wolk.170  If passed, the bill would make the use and creation of IFDs easier 
for local governments by removing the statutory requirement that voters 
approve the IFD’s issuance of debt, and expand the use of such funding to a 
wider variety of projects.171  Funding would not come out of the general fund, 
however, unlike banned tax increment funding.172  Though the bill still exists, 
the Senate placed it in its “inactive file” on September 11th, 2013.173
The use of Mello-Roos Community Facilities District (“CFD”) funding 
provides another option for cities looking to continue redevelopment efforts 
while allowing for a broader range of projects than an IFD.  A CFD is an area 
within which a city imposes a special tax, higher than the normal, on 
properties in order to provide additional revenue to pay the interest and 
principal on issued bonds so that the city may raise redevelopment funds for 
public improvements.
 
174  California Government Code section 53313.5 lists a 
nonexhaustive number of projects that CFD may be used for, including: 
making “energy efficiency, water conservation, and renewable energy 
improvements” to real properties, repairing soil deterioration caused by 
privately held properties, bringing properties into compliance with seismic 
regulations, and constructing and public utilities transmission and 
distribution facilities.175
Many cities and municipalities like the City and County of San 
Francisco already utilize CFD funding for new projects.  In early February 
2013, San Francisco RDA’s successor agency became the first such agency in 
the state to issue new bonds since the dissolution of the state’s RDAs, 
selling $123 million of debt left over from the former San Francisco RDA.
 
176  
SAs must earmark the funds for repayment of the tax bonds previously 
issued by the RDA for the Mission Bay Redevelopment North and South 
Project, as well as reimburse this project’s master developer.177
170. SB 33, Cal. Legislature, 2013-2014 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB33. 
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this is a positive development for redevelopment in the city, and will bring 
an influx of cash to the city, the anticipated funding falls short of the 
estimated $700 million cost of full completion of the project.178
C. Local Recapture of Redevelopment Funds
 
Since the decision in Matosantos, some in the development industry 
have deemed our time the era of “missing tax increment funding,” 
responsible for stalled projects across the state.179  Some cities have 
responded to these changes by refusing to return their remaining 
redevelopment funds back to the state, the majority of which come from the 
20% of TIF that RDAs were required to pay into affordable housing.180  In 
Santa Clara, for instance, the mayor and city council recently sent a letter to 
constituents asking them to allow the city to take steps towards retaining a 
large chunk of redevelopment funds.181  California is currently asking Santa 
Clara for over $300 million back in redevelopment assets, and the fight over 
the redistribution of RDA assets has led to delays in the construction of a 
school, public park and even a low-income senior housing project.182
Further north, in Oakland, Mayor Jean Quan is attempting to move 
forward with plans to use $18 million in redevelopment funding for 
affordable housing, despite admonitions against such actions from the 
California Department of Finance.
   
183
Actions, Mission Bay South Redevelopment Project Area (Jan. 14, 2013), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9616. 
  In July 2013, the Oakland City Council 
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money. 
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183. Calif: Oakland can’t spend $18M on redevelopment, KVTU (Jan. 11, 2013),
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passed a proposal to set aside 25% of all former redevelopment TIF revenue 
funds that will be redistributed by the state to local county, school districts 
and other entities into the Oakland Affordable Housing Trust Fund.184
In addition to tax recapture mechanisms, courts have also become a 
popular avenue for cities to voice their grievances over the new law.  Over 
fifty cities filed lawsuits against the state in order to recoup monies loaned 
by cities to former redevelopment agencies, and to protest the state Finance 
Department’s rejections of various redevelopment projects as enforceable 
obligations.
  
185  Most notably, the League of California Cities filed a 
complaint against the state in October 2012, alleging that AB 1484 
unconstitutionally reallocates local sales and use taxes from cities to the 
state Department of Finance.186  The League of California Cities’ primary 
claim is that AB 1484’s “true-up” payment system, which requires local SAs 
to pay back alleged overpayments of tax increment to RDAs prior to their 
dissolution, unfairly takes money from city coffers to cover SAs inabilities to 
pay.187  After a ruling against the League of California Cities, in September 
2013 the judge presiding over the case granted their motion for 
reconsideration based on new facts.188  Though these lawsuits are still quite 
new, the state could be liable for over $3 billion to cities and counties if 
such suits ultimately succeed, a number that exceeds the money saved by 
dissolving RDAs.189
If cities fail to recoup redevelopment funds, they may be exposed to 
third-party lawsuits for choosing to cancel or scale back existing 
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redevelopment projects.  These kinds of actions could be construed as a 
breach of contract, and substantial amounts of development and land use 
funds are at stake in the battle.190
V. Conclusion
  However, these suits may be unavoidable 
to a certain extent as a byproduct of the dissolution of RDAs, and cities will 
have to invariably seek out a patchwork of different types of financing to 
replace missing redevelopment funds.  These alternative sources of funding, 
though they exist to varying degrees, are unlikely to completely replace the 
deficits left in city budgets by AB 1X 26. 
A potentially debilitating budget crisis provided a fitting background
for the Matosantos ruling and AB 1X 26, and the financial desperation 
stemming from this desperate reality undoubtedly clouded Governor Jerry 
Brown’s radical budget actions.  Now, the state has rebounded from its 
steep budget deficit of over $26 billion only three years ago to a projected 
budget surplus of $2.3 billion for the fiscal year 2014-15.191  This budget 
surplus casts doubt upon the ultimate propriety of the dissolution of RDAs, 
and increasing calls for the reinstatement and recreation of such agencies 
can be heard in light of this reality.  However, until that day comes, if ever, 
cities and counties will have to become even more creative in how they 
sustainably develop brownfields and hazardous sites within their 
boundaries.  Despite sharp decreases in local funding, urban revitalization 
and economic and community development must continue to progress in 
California, and brownfields remain promising locations for such growth.  
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